    @article {IonnaisPanosMihalisAlcarazLopez2018,
	title = {Survey of IoT-enabled Cyberattacks: Assessing Attack Paths to Critical Infrastructures and Services},
	journal = { IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials},
	volume = {20},
	year = {2018},
	month = {07/2018},
	pages = {3453-3495},
	publisher = {IEEE},
	abstract = {<p class="rtejustify">As the deployment of Internet of Things (IoT)\&nbsp;is experiencing an exponential growth, it is no surprise that\&nbsp;many recent cyber attacks are IoT-enabled: The attacker initially\&nbsp;exploits some vulnerable IoT technology as a first step towards\&nbsp;compromising a critical system that is connected, in some way,\&nbsp;with the IoT. For some sectors, like industry, smart grids,\&nbsp;transportation and medical services, the significance of such\&nbsp;attacks is obvious, since IoT technologies are part of critical backend\&nbsp;systems. However, in sectors where IoT is usually at the enduser\&nbsp;side, like smart homes, such attacks can be underestimated,\&nbsp;since not all possible attack paths are examined. In this paper\&nbsp;we survey IoT-enabled cyber attacks, found in all application\&nbsp;domains since 2010. For each sector, we emphasize on the latest,\&nbsp;verified IoT-enabled attacks, based on known real-world incidents\&nbsp;and published proof-of-concept attacks. We methodologically\&nbsp;analyze representative attacks that demonstrate direct, indirect\&nbsp;and subliminal attack paths against critical targets. Our goal is\&nbsp;threefold: (i) To assess IoT-enabled cyber attacks in a risk-like\&nbsp;approach, in order to demonstrate their current threat landscape;\&nbsp;(ii) To identify hidden and subliminal IoT-enabled attack paths\&nbsp;against critical infrastructures and services, and (iii) To examine\&nbsp;mitigation strategies for all application domains.</p>
},
	keywords = {Critical Infrastructures, Cyber Attacks, Intelligent Transportation Systems, Internet of Things, SCADA, Smart grids, Smart Home, Smart Medical Systems},
	issn = {1553-877X},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.1109/COMST.2018.2855563},
	url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8410404},
	author = {Ioannis Stellios and Panayiotis Kotzanikolaou and Mihalis Psarakis and Cristina Alcaraz and Javier Lopez}
}
