@article {Syrmakesis2022, title = {Classifying resilience approaches for protecting smart grids against cyber threats}, journal = {International Journal of Information Security}, volume = {21}, year = {2022}, month = {05/2022}, pages = {1189{\textendash}1210}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Springer Verlag}, abstract = {

Smart grids (SG) draw the attention of cyber attackers due to their vulnerabilities, which are caused by the usage of heterogeneous communication technologies and their distributed nature. While preventing or detecting cyber attacks is a well-studied field of research, making SG more resilient against such threats is a challenging task. This paper provides a classification of the proposed cyber resilience methods against cyber attacks for SG. This classification includes a set of studies that propose cyber-resilient approaches to protect SG and related cyber-physical systems against unforeseen anomalies or deliberate attacks. Each study is briefly analyzed and is associated with the proper cyber resilience technique which is given by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in the Special Publication 800-160. These techniques are also linked to the different states of the typical resilience curve. Consequently, this paper highlights the most critical challenges for achieving cyber resilience, reveals significant cyber resilience aspects that have not been sufficiently considered yet and, finally, proposes scientific areas that should be further researched in order to enhance the cyber resilience of SG.

}, keywords = {Cyber threats, cyber-physical systems, resilience, Smart grids}, issn = {1615-5262}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-022-00594-7}, url = {https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10207-022-00594-7.pdf}, author = {Andrew D. Syrmakesis and Cristina Alcaraz and Nikos D. Hatziargyriou~} } @article {alcarazlopez-IEEESystems-2017, title = {A Cyber-Physical Systems-Based Checkpoint Model for Structural Controllability}, journal = {IEEE Systems Journal}, volume = {12}, year = {2018}, month = {12/2018}, pages = {3543-3554}, publisher = {IEEE}, abstract = {

The protection of critical user-centric applications,\ such as Smart Grids and their monitoring systems, has become\ one of the most cutting-edge research areas in recent years.\ The dynamic complexity of their cyber-physical systems (CPSs)\ and their strong inter-dependencies with power systems, are\ bringing about a significant increase in security problems that\ may be exploited by attackers. These security holes may, for\ example, trigger the disintegration of the structural controllability\ properties due to the problem of non-locality, affecting, sooner\ or later, the provision of the essential services to end-users.\ One way to address these situations could be through automatic\ checkpoints in charge of inspecting the healthy status of the\ control network and its critical nature. This inspection can be\ subject to special mechanisms\ composed of trustworthy cyberphysical\ elements\ capable of detecting structural changes in the\ control and activating restoration procedures\ with support for\ warning. This is precisely the aim of this paper, which presents\ a CPSs-based checkpoint model with the capacity to manage\ heterogeneous replications that help ensure data redundancy,\ thereby guaranteeing the validity of the checkpoints. As a support\ to this study,\ a theoretical and practical analysis is addressed to\ show the functionality of the approach in real contexts.

}, keywords = {Critical Control Systems, cyber-physical systems, Smart grids, structural controllability}, issn = {1932-8184}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1109/JSYST.2017.2740719}, url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8057984/}, author = {Cristina Alcaraz and Javier Lopez} } @article {IonnaisPanosMihalisAlcarazLopez2018, title = {Survey of IoT-enabled Cyberattacks: Assessing Attack Paths to Critical Infrastructures and Services}, journal = { IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials}, volume = {20}, year = {2018}, month = {07/2018}, pages = {3453-3495}, publisher = {IEEE}, abstract = {

As the deployment of Internet of Things (IoT)\ is experiencing an exponential growth, it is no surprise that\ many recent cyber attacks are IoT-enabled: The attacker initially\ exploits some vulnerable IoT technology as a first step towards\ compromising a critical system that is connected, in some way,\ with the IoT. For some sectors, like industry, smart grids,\ transportation and medical services, the significance of such\ attacks is obvious, since IoT technologies are part of critical backend\ systems. However, in sectors where IoT is usually at the enduser\ side, like smart homes, such attacks can be underestimated,\ since not all possible attack paths are examined. In this paper\ we survey IoT-enabled cyber attacks, found in all application\ domains since 2010. For each sector, we emphasize on the latest,\ verified IoT-enabled attacks, based on known real-world incidents\ and published proof-of-concept attacks. We methodologically\ analyze representative attacks that demonstrate direct, indirect\ and subliminal attack paths against critical targets. Our goal is\ threefold: (i) To assess IoT-enabled cyber attacks in a risk-like\ approach, in order to demonstrate their current threat landscape;\ (ii) To identify hidden and subliminal IoT-enabled attack paths\ against critical infrastructures and services, and (iii) To examine\ mitigation strategies for all application domains.

}, keywords = {Critical Infrastructures, Cyber Attacks, Intelligent Transportation Systems, Internet of Things, SCADA, Smart grids, Smart Home, Smart Medical Systems}, issn = {1553-877X}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1109/COMST.2018.2855563}, url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8410404}, author = {Ioannis Stellios and Panayiotis Kotzanikolaou and Mihalis Psarakis and Cristina Alcaraz and Javier Lopez} } @article {1770, title = {Smart Control of Operational Threats in Control Substations}, journal = {Computers \& Security}, volume = {38}, year = {2013}, month = {OCT 2013}, pages = {14-27}, publisher = {Elsevier}, abstract = {

Any deliberate or unsuitable operational action in control tasks of critical infrastructures, such as energy generation, transmission and distribution systems that comprise sub-domains of a Smart Grid, could have a significant impact on the digital economy: without energy, the digital economy cannot live. In addition, the vast majority of these types of critical systems are configured in isolated locations where their control depends on the ability of a few, supposedly trustworthy, human operators. However, this assumption of reliabilty is not always true. Malicious human operators (criminal insiders) might take advantage of these situations to intentionally manipulate the critical nature of the underlying infrastructure. These criminal actions could be not attending to emergency events, inadequately responding to incidents or trying to alter the normal behaviour of the system with malicious actions. For this reason, in\ this paper we propose a smart response mechanism that controls human operators{\textquoteright} operational threats at all times. Moreover, the design of this mechanism allows the system to be able to not only evaluate by itself, the situation of a particular scenario but also to take control when areas are totally unprotected and/or isolated. The response mechanism, which is based on Industrial Wireless Sensor Networks (IWSNs) for the constant monitoring of observed critical\ infrastructures, on reputation for controlling human operators{\textquoteright} actions, and on the ISA100.11a standard for alarm management, has been implemented and simulated to evaluate its feasibility for critical contexts.

}, keywords = {Digital Economy, Energy Control Systems, Reputation, security, Smart grids, wireless sensor networks}, issn = {0167-4048}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2013.03.013}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404813000588}, author = {Javier Lopez and Cristina Alcaraz and Rodrigo Roman} } @inproceedings {alcaraz2012b, title = {Smart Grid Privacy: Issues and Solutions}, booktitle = {21st International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN)}, year = {2012}, month = {Jul 2012}, pages = {1-5}, publisher = {IEEE Computer Society}, organization = {IEEE Computer Society}, address = {Munich, Germany}, abstract = {

Migration to an electronically controlled electrical grid to transmit, distribute, and deliver power to consumers has helped enhance the reliability and efficiency of conventional electricity systems. At the same time, this digitally enabled technology called the Smart Grid has brought new challenges to businesses and consumers alike. A key component of such a grid is the smart-metering technology, which is used to collect energy consumption data from homes and transmitting it back to power distributors. A crucial concern is the privacy related to the collection and use of energy consumption data. We present an analysis of Smart Grid privacy issues and discuss recently proposed solutions that can protect the privacy of Smart Grid users.

}, keywords = {Computer architecture, Data privacy, Electricity, Home appliances, privacy, security, Smart grids}, isbn = {978-1-4673-1543-2}, doi = {10.1109/ICCCN.2012.6289304}, url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?tp=\&arnumber=6289304\&contentType=Conference+Publications\&openedRefinements\%3D*\%26pageNumber\%3D7\%26rowsPerPage\%3D100\%26queryText\%3D\%28smart+grid\%29}, author = {F. Siddiqui and S. Zeadally and Cristina Alcaraz and S. Galvao} }