

PDR: A Prevention, Detection and Response Mechanism for Anomalies in Energy Control Systems

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Abstract

Prevention, detection and response are nowadays considered to be three priority topics for protecting critical infrastructures, such as energy control systems. Despite attempts to address these current issues, there is still a particular lack of investigation in these areas, and in particular in dynamic and automatic proactive solutions. In this paper we propose a mechanism, which is called PDR, with the capability of anticipating anomalies, detecting anomalous behaviours and responding to them in a timely manner. PDR is based on a conglomeration of technologies and on a set of essential components with the purpose of offering situational awareness irrespective of where the system is located. In addition, the mechanism can also compute its functional capacities by evaluating its efficacy and precision in the prediction and detection of disturbances. With this, the entire system is able to know the real reliability of its services and its activity in remote substations at all times.

Keywords: Detection, Energy Control Systems, Industrial Wireless Sensor Networks, MANET, Prevention, Response, The Internet, and Wide-Area Situational Awareness.

1 Introduction

Modernisation of our critical energy control infrastructures is bringing a set of unexplored and unsolved challenges. Most of them are mainly related to the need to find a desirable trade-off between operational performance in (almost) real-time, and protection against serious threats. These threats do not necessarily have to be cyber-attacks [1]. They can be associated with unforeseen or abrupt changes registered within the system, such as a power surge in generators or a voltage reduction in transmission lines. If these unexpected situations are not controlled properly, they may trigger a serious effect that may lead to local, regional or national outages and/or blackouts,

with the possibility of spreading on its own to other countries. This is the case of the well-known blackout of August 14, 2003 that occasioned an economic and social crisis between two countries; U.S. and Canada. Unfortunately, this kind of event has not been the only one that has happened in recent years [2].

Considering the application domain and its sensitive nature, this protection should consist of proactive and reactive solutions based on dynamic and automatic methods. The reason lies in that the vast majority of energy control subsystems (e.g. substations) are distributed at distant-geographic locations in which the control is normally limited to a few human operators in the field. This need was also identified by NIST in [3], and NIST classified this need as one of the eight priorities to be taken into account when protecting Critical Infrastructures (CIs). This priority, known as *Wide-Area Situational Awareness* (WASA), focuses on supervising and controlling the performance of underlying systems located over large geographic areas in (almost) real-time. This includes anticipating, detecting and responding to problems before they can cause disruptions.

Given this, we present a dynamic solution that tries to cover some of the stated points for WASA, such as prevention, detection and response. The proposed approach, called here as PDR, is based on four main technologies; Industrial Wireless Sensor Networks (IWSNs), Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs), the Internet and the ISA100.11a standard [4]. We have selected these technologies as each one of them offers an attractive set of benefits for local and remote protection [5, 6]. Moreover, the architecture suggested for PDR is also able to evaluate by itself the level of precision of the schemes proposed for detection and prevention. Any information from the system has to be reported sooner or later to the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Center so that it can be made aware of the accuracy and functionality of the approach, and to remotely control the situation at all times and any time.

Although there are currently some similar works to this proposal, there are also important differences that should be stressed here. For example, Roman et al. [7] presented a lightweight situation awareness mechanism based on a WSN and on a set of statistical and collaborative techniques. Similarly, He et al. [8] presented a situational awareness mechanism based on the multivariate times series association technique to observe the functionality of a set of sensors. However, none of them ensures preventive and reactive capacities that enable the system to take the control against incidents, faults or threats such as we try addressing in this paper. This means that there are a special research lack within this area, and effort to deliver dynamic and intelligent solutions based on WSNs should be still needed.

The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the general architecture of PDR together with the technologies that play a special role within our approach. The details of the components that comprise the architecture are described in Section 3, whilst three proactive and reactive methods are discussed in the remainder of the same section. Section 4 concludes the paper and outlines future work.

2 PDR: General Architecture and Technologies

The architecture proposed for PDR is mainly based on IWSNs, MANETs, the Internet, and ISA100.11a. Figure 1 illustrates an example of the collaboration and cooperation




Figure 1: General Architecture of the PDR mechanism

of such technologies for control and supervision of energy generation and distribution systems. This figure also represents, in a general way, the operation in the field and energy distribution from bulk generations systems (e.g. nuclear systems, hydroelectric systems, wind farms, and others) to urban areas [3].

For electricity production, the majority of generation systems have to be connected to generators to induce mechanical energy into electric energy to a low voltage. To increase the level of voltage and its transmission over long distances, the system makes use of large electricity transmission lines with transformers (transmission system). To distribute the power to urban areas, the voltage load must be downloaded into substations reducing its level of voltage (distribution system). Both transmission and distribution substations are based on transformers, control devices (e.g. Remote Terminal Units (RTUs)), industrial meters, sensors and industrial engineering devices. Any activity in the field must be supervised, either locally or remotely, and any information produced or sensed must be sent to a centralised system for purposes of control and register. All of this control system is commonly known as a SCADA System.

Unfortunately, this complex circuit of power generation and distribution is quite sensitive to unexpected events. This means that one fault registered in a local point of the system could trigger a change in its normal behaviour, probably leading to a cascading effect towards other CIs [9]. To control and coordinate these types of unforeseen situations, we distribute IWSNs and MANETs throughout the entire system and close to its more sensitive parts, such as energy generators, motors, turbines, industrial engines, transformers, and others. In order to understand their functionalities in the field, we describe in detail their particular characteristics and services below.

An IWSN [10] is composed of small and smart devices with the capability (4MHz-32MHz micro-processor, 8KB-128KB RAM, 128KB-192KB ROM) for sensing real states of an object or its surroundings. These states are associated with physical events in the context, such as temperature, pressure, voltage, vibration, etc. To measure these types of events, sensor nodes should be deployed close to the supervised target, for example, generators or motors of wind turbines (See Fig. 1). As conventional sensor

nodes, industrial sensor nodes are also autonomous devices capable of processing and transmitting information to a base station. In our case, this base station is a powerful gateway device. Industrial sensor nodes can also offer services of auto-configuration, auto-organisation, self-monitoring and self-healing, detection, warning and tracking of anomalous behaviours or threatening situations such as peaks in voltage in electrical pylons or abrupt changes of temperature registered in industrial engines, as well as querying and reporting on-demand. All of these features and services have encouraged both industry and government to modernise their CIs. Indeed, the industrial sector is aware of the advantages and opportunities of this technology to increase its levels of competitiveness, productivity and efficiency [10]. On the other hand, the government needs the technology to find a way to protect many of our CIs. According to the last report of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARPA) of 2009 [3], the U.S. already aims to invest in new information and communication systems in order to automate, for example, substations with smart sensors. The reasoning behind this investment is to find ways to avoid or mitigate disturbances and instabilities generated in remote locations.

Having commented this, we are not saying that IWSNs intend to replace traditional wired industrial systems, such as RTUs. Instead, they try to offer a complementary tool for maximizing automation tasks and ensuring protection. As mentioned above, this protection includes all of the potential capabilities for prevention, detection and response against anomalous events of the system. An anomalous event is defined by the Oxford dictionary as “*something that deviates from what is standard, normal, or expected*” [11]. For our case, we identify two types of anomalies; *infrastructural anomalies* and *control anomalies*. The former type is related to the deviations associated with normal behaviour of the observed infrastructure, such as high/low voltage level, strong stress, high/low temperature, corrosion, gas/oil leaks, etc. In contrast, the latter type refers to the normal behaviour of the control network; i.e. the IWSN. This technology is quite sensitive to many type of threats (from hardware threats to application threats [12, 7]). This is due to its mesh topology and their wireless-channels, in where harsh industrial conditions (e.g. vibration or noise) could also break their links and cause unreliable communication. For simplicity reasons, we particularly focus in this paper on time-related threats (i.e., delayed packets or do not reach their destination at all) and availability threats (i.e., physical unavailability of a sensor), such as de-synchronisation (deSync) in the communication channels (i.e., the communication between two nodes is deviated from the initial configuration), loss of information, information relay or exhaustion of energy.

Continuing with the architecture of PDR, it also includes MANET networks as a self-configuring technology of mobile devices connected by wireless links. This kind of communication enables human operators to locally manage the systems, allowing their mobility in the field and collaboration with other human operators. Any information acquired from sensors can be visualised by their hand-held interfaces (e.g. a PDA). These interfaces facilitate the automation tasks by managing; (i) measurements, i.e. physical events, (ii) alarms with relevant data on real states from the observed infrastructure, or (iii) commands with a particular action. For communication from/to sensors, it is currently possible to apply wireless industrial communication protocols, such as ZigBee PRO [13], WirelessHART [14] or ISA100.11a. We focus our attention

on the ISA100.11a standard for several reasons. First of all, it is an extended version of WirelessHART and was intended for industrial environments. Thus, it provides a set of useful services to address the coexistence with other technologies, communication reliability (e.g. use of hopping and blacklisting methods) and alarm management based on priorities. Second, it improves some of the security services of the ZigBee PRO, such as the key negotiation process in commissioning phase [6]. Another advantage of ISA100.11a is its flexibility for configuring wireless networks.

We believe that a good approach for our architecture is a hierarchical configuration; i.e. a network based on clusters of sensors. For each cluster, a trustworthy sensor is selected, which is known as the Cluster Head (CH) with a unique ID_{CH} . The main reasons of selecting this configuration are several. This conformation of clusters does not only reduce computational costs in sensors, but it also facilitates a rapid location of a problem by knowing the sensor deployment and the affected area. In addition, the studies made in [15] clearly highlight the effectiveness and suitability of the technology for awareness situational within Smart Grid contexts, since the most of the current SCADA wireless communication protocols (e.g., Zigbee or ISA100.11a) can be configured following a star topology and the use of the gateway enables the underlying system to establish connectivity with other networks (e.g., MANETs, Bluetooth). However, there is a problem that should be stressed here: CHs may be susceptible to threats or failures, putting the supervision of a neighbourhood at risk/isolation. A possible solution would be to perform re-clustering techniques or deployment of redundant nodes [16].

Nonetheless, and to simplify the architecture of our approach, we consider that CHs are trustworthy nodes and they are not threatened. They are responsible for (i) filtering and aggregating measurements (inherent tasks of any CH), (ii) receiving alarms from its sensors, and (iii) resending any information to the gateway. Here, the gateway acts as a powerful interface between the acquisition world and the SCADA Center, with the capability for processing data and translating different types of messages. For reasons of simplicity, we assume that the communication link ‘sensor-sensor’ and ‘sensor-gateway’ are protected by using security services of ISA100.11a, and communication ‘gateway-hand-held’ and ‘gateway-SCADA Center’ are protected through security services of the TCP/IP standard and/or virtual private networks.

Table 1 summarises the advantages of building a proactive and reactive system based on IWSNs, MANETs, ISA100.11a and the Internet. Note that this table is based on the needs identified for WASA and on the studies done on WSNs, MANETs and the Internet in [5]. When combining technologies, different types of advantages are obtained, such as *monitoring*, *prevention*, *detection*, *alerting*, *response*, *collaboration* and *mobility*. Given this, the next step is to present the approach using the mentioned technologies.

Technologies		Monitoring	Prevention	Detection	Alert	Response	Collaboration	Mobility
A	IWSN & ISA100.11a	√-local	√	√	√		√-local	
B	MANETs	√-local				√-local	√-local	√
C	The Internet	√-remote					√-remote	
D	A & B & C	√-local/remote	√	√	√	√	√-local/remote	√

Table 1: Advantages of using IWSNs, MANETs, ISA100.11a and the Internet for WASA




Figure 2: Cluster Head: Dissemination and Warning

3 PDR in Wide-Area Situational Awareness

As mentioned in Section 2, the sensor network follows a hierarchical configuration where CHs take on a special role within our approach. Each CH is configured with four main modules; a *Normalisation* module, a *Behaviour Pattern* module, a *Filtration-Aggregation* module and an *Alarm Manager* module (See Fig. 2). Any reading value of voltage, $volt_i$, from sensors must be normalised by the Normalisation module in order to format and standardise their contents. The normalised message is later processed by the Behaviour Pattern module so as to identify normal or abnormal states. Normal states refer to those acceptable voltage reading values that are inside permitted thresholds, $[V_{min}, V_{max}]$. For these states, each CH has to (i) filter and aggregate the new value through the Filtration-Aggregation module, and (ii) send the aggregated values to the gateway. When the message is received by the gateway, it re-sends the message to the SCADA Center for supervision purposes, accountability or future analyses.

For unacceptable states ($volt_i \notin [V_{min}, V_{max}]$), it is essential to differentiate and classify different kind of states that could happen in our application context. One way to classify it would be to (i) consider the six levels of priority offered by the ISA100.11a standard [4], namely *normal*, *journal*, *low*, *medium*, *high* and *urgent* signalled with 0 to 5 respectively (such a value is denoted here as v_i), and (ii) define priority thresholds for each state. These thresholds not only depend on the security policies, but also the established policies for each country/organization.

Depending on the v_i and priority thresholds, the CH, through the Alarm Manager, will have to generate a particular type of alert with a specific label; *journal*, *low*, *medium*, *high* and *urgent*. The alert has to be sent to the gateway. For generation of the alert, the manager makes use of ISA100.11a objects. In particular, these objects come




Figure 3: Architecture of the Gateway: Incidents Management and Warning

from the ARMO (Alert Reporting Management Object) class, and they have to be received and processed by a unique device in the system (in our case, the gateway), which contains the ARO (Alert Receiving Object) class of ISA100.11a. When alarms arrive to the gateway, the system is expected to respond to them properly and in a timely manner. For this reason, we deal with the prevention, detection and response in this section. Our intention is to anticipate infrastructural anomalies, detect suspicious behaviours in the control network and provide a rapid response to face incidents. These three activities will be configured inside the gateway using a set of interconnected modules (See Fig. 3). In particular, five main modules; an *ARO Manager* module, a *Prevention* module, a *Detection* module, a *Diagnostic* module, and an *Alarm Manager* module.

Any incident from the control network has to be received by the ARO Manager. It is in charge of queuing incidents according to their priorities and handling critical alarms [4,5]. These alarms have to be forwarded to the Alarm Manager Module so that it can locate the nearest staff in the field immediately. For localisation of human operators, it is necessary to depend on the global positioning technologies and an updated database with information relative to deployment knowledge of sensors and human operators' availability according to their contracts. Both tasks are performed by the sub-module *Location Sensor & Operator*. Lastly, and continuing with the ARO Manager, any non-critical evidence must be temporally stored in a cache memory for purposes of prevention, detection and response. Given that these three aspects are relevant topics within our approach, we will discuss them in-depth in the following sections.

3.1 Prevention of Infrastructural Anomalies through a Forecasting Model

Deviations in system attributes such as temperature or voltage levels are the main indicators of infrastructural anomalies. In this section, we propose a forecasting model to prevent these anomalies, particularly focusing on the voltage measurements. However, the model can easily be extended to other attributes as well.




Figure 4: Early warning alert and threshold value

	α	T for D_1	T for D_2		α	T for D_1	T for D_2
$k = 5$	0.01	14	9	$k = 10$	0.01	15	23
	0.05	11	7		0.05	12	20
	0.10	10	6		0.10	11	19

Table 2: False alarm probabilities and corresponding threshold values for D_1 and D_2 depending on k previous values.

As mentioned in previous sections, ISA100.11a classifies voltage measurement using six criticality levels ([0-5]). Receiving voltage measurements with level 4 or 5 requires the attention of the operators within a short time period. The forecasting algorithm may detect an anomaly before receiving a critical alarm (e.g. about 20 minutes ahead), and this enables the operator to have more time to resolve the problem.

The forecasting model aims to predict the occurrence of the critical alarms based on the assessment of previously received signals. To this end, the CH_s collect the signals from sensors and send them to the gateway to be temporarily stored in a cache memory, which stores the voltage measurements received over the last ΔT_{window} minutes. Note that the Prediction module exports all the information with priority [0-3] from this cache to a internal buffer stored by ID_{CHj} and ID_{si} . This buffer is applied for analyzing the behaviour of the system in the following minutes. Exportation is done each time period (denoted here as $\Delta T_{diagnosticPrevention}$), the value of which is defined by the security policies.

Evaluation of the values in cache memory is done independently for each sensor. When the system is stable, we assume that these measurements follow an independent discrete probability distribution with $Pr(v = i) = p_i$ for $i = 0, 1, \dots, 5$, with $p_0, p_1, p_2, p_3 \geq 0$ and $p_4 = p_5 = 0$, where v is the voltage measurement level. It should be noted that the distribution of v should be estimated based on previous signals received when the system is in stable position. Moreover, the estimated distribution should be tested periodically, especially after making some infrastructural changes to the system. When there is an incident in the system, the distribution of v starts to deviate from the original distribution. The measurements tend to increase and eventually the sensors generate critical alarms, i.e. p_4 and p_5 are no longer zero.

Let (v_1, v_2, \dots, v_k) be the measurements corresponding to a particular sensor in the temporary cache memory that are received in the last ΔT_{window} minutes. The evaluation of the forecasting algorithm is based on the summation of v_i values, $S_k = v_1 + v_2 +$

$\dots + v_k$. Whenever the summation is greater than a threshold value, the algorithm sends an early warning alert for the corresponding sensor. The threshold value T is selected so that $Pr(S_k \geq T) \approx \alpha$, where α is an acceptable false alarm probability, i.e. the probability that the forecasting unit incorrectly outputs an early warning (See Fig. 4). Calculation of this probability requires the distribution of the S_k , which can be determined by induction, using the facts (i) the distribution of S_1 is equal to the distribution of v_i 's, and (ii) the distribution of $S_k = S_{k-1} + v_k$. Table 2 provides threshold and false alarm probabilities for two example distributions, D_1 and D_2 , where D_1 is the discrete uniform distribution i.e., $p_i = 0.25$ for $i = 0, \dots, 3$ and D_2 satisfies $p_i \approx 2p_{i+1}$, for $i = 0, 1, 2$, i.e., $p_0 = 0.5335$, $p_1 = 0.2667$, $p_2 = 0.1333$ and $p_3 = 0.0665$.

3.2 Detection of Control Anomalies

As mentioned above, the Detection module is in charge of detecting suspicious anomalies in the sensor network. These anomalies are related to relays, deSync and loss of sensitive information, as well as the presence of dead nodes. To control these threatening situations, we use four counters for each sensor; C_{relay} , C_{deSync} , $C_{lossInf}$ and $C_{deadNode}$. These counters should be frequently initialised when a given time for diagnosis, $\Delta T^{diagnosticDetection}$, is attained.

For diagnostic, the Detection module needs to evaluate the time-stamp of each message received. If the time-stamp of a specific message is outside of an established maximum time for receiving messages (T_{MAX}), then the module may deduce that such a message was lost within the network, increasing the value of the counter $C_{lossInf}$. It is also possible that the time-stamp is within the required time, but a relay threat or a deSync threat are happening in the field. To detect a relay threat, a correlation process should be carried out so as to check evidence streams with information stored in the cache, the entries of which should be ordered by the time-stamp so as to speed up the process of search and correlation of values. In this way, if a specific sensor s_i with ID_{s_i} already sent a message with time-stamp $_{s_i}$ in the past, then the Detection module may infer that a relay attack is starting within the system, increasing its C_{relay} . Similarly, we require configuration information related to each sensor, such as the expected time to receive an evidence, to detect a deSync threat. If a sensor s_i with ID_{s_i} sends messages outside expected time period, the Detection module increases the counter C_{deSync} . This also means that it is important to take into account the network configuration, as ISA100.11a offers the possibility of configuring the time division multiple access with specific a time-slot for the data link layer, in addition to providing a customizable hopping method for 16 channels. Note that two further situations may arise when a deSync threat is frequently produced within the network; (i) hardware or software problems, or (ii) the presence of a delay attack. A delay attack refers to forwarding information in a desynchronized manner in order to provoke delays in the reception of messages.

However, none of the previous measures control the presence of a dead node, which could be caused by a physical attack, energy exhaustion or a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. To this end, we use a diagnostic procedure, which is frequently executed when $\Delta T^{diagnosticDetection}$ is reached. This procedure checks the cache memory in order to see whether a particular sensor s_i with ID_{s_i} temporally stopped its activity in the field. If so, the Detection module has to update the counter $C_{deadNode}$. When four counters exceed

their respective prescribed thresholds, the Detection module will have to warn of the situation immediately. The notification must include $CH_j-ID_{CH_j}$, $s_i-ID_{s_i}$, the type of event and the priority of the detected event. The events can range from ‘relay-threat’, ‘deSync-threat’, ‘lossInf-threat’ to ‘dead-node’. To complete the functionality of this part of the approach, we recommend to consider for a future other further detection measures (e.g., jamming, hardware failure, node subversion, tampered, manipulation), many of which are extensively analysed in [6, 7].

3.3 Response to Anomalies and Evaluation

After the resolution of incidents in the field, human operators should provide the system with enough feedback on the situation to be able to evaluate the level of precision (either of the prediction module or the detection module) (cf. Section 3.1 and Section 3.2). This feedback consists of three simple values; *good*, *bad* and *undetected*, and they have to be introduced through authorised hand-held interfaces and sent back to the gateway. When this feedback is received by the gateway, it has to be managed by the Diagnostic module to rate the final behaviour of the Prediction module and the Detection module. Given that we predict infrastructural anomalies and detect control anomalies, such feedback also has to include the type of resolution; i.e. an infrastructural issue or a control issue. With all of this information, the Diagnostic module has to compute a set of counters, which are declared as follows:

- Two counters of *True Positive* ($C_{PredictionTP}$ and $C_{DetectionTP}$) are incremented whenever a suspicious threat was properly predicted/detected by the system, and the human operator’s feedback indicates a ‘good’ value.
- Two counters of *False Positive* ($C_{PredictionFP}$ and $C_{DetectionFP}$) are incremented whenever a suspicious threat was not correctly predicted/detected, and the human operator’s feedback signals it as a ‘bad’ value.
- Two counters of *False Negative* ($C_{PredictionFN}$ and $C_{DetectionFN}$) are incremented whenever the human operator’s feedback indicates the presence of an undetected critical situation (an ‘undetected’ value), and the approach was not able to detect it.
- Two counters of *True Negative* ($C_{PredictionTN}$ and $C_{DetectionTN}$) are incremented whenever a valid situation (e.g. $volt_i \in [V_{min}, V_{max}]$) happens within the system and it was properly classified by the system as innocuous.

Considering all these variables, the Diagnostic module has to find the way to evaluate the precision of our mechanism throughout its entire life-cycle. To this end, a set of metrics and measures of contingency described in [17] have been considered for our mechanism. These metrics consist of estimating the ‘precision’ by eventually computing the equations of Table 3.

Rate	Prevention	Detection
True Positive	$\frac{C_{PredictionTP}}{C_{PredictionTP} + C_{PredictionFP}}$	$\frac{C_{DetectionTP}}{C_{DetectionTP} + C_{DetectionFP}}$
False Positive	$\frac{C_{PredictionFP}}{C_{PredictionFP} + C_{PredictionTN}} \leq T_{PredictionFP}$	$\frac{C_{DetectionFP}}{C_{DetectionFP} + C_{DetectionTN}} \leq T_{DetectionFP}$
False Negative	$\frac{C_{PredictionFN}}{C_{PredictionFN} + C_{PredictionTP}} \leq T_{PredictionFN}$	$\frac{C_{DetectionFN}}{C_{DetectionFN} + C_{DetectionTP}} \leq T_{DetectionFN}$

Table 3: Precision Levels of the Prevention and Detection modules

Table 3 also shows us a set of thresholds, namely $T_{PredictionFP}$, $T_{PredictionFN}$, $T_{DetectionFP}$, $T_{DetectionFN}$, which should be defined to control the real level of precision of the modules. Note that the threshold for false negative rates should be much more restrictive with respect to the rest, since it is unacceptable that a control system cannot be able to predict/detect undesirable situations. Thus, when a false negative rate (either $C_{PredictionFN}$ or $C_{DetectionFN}$) is higher than its prescribed threshold, a report should be generated to warn the SCADA Center of the situation immediately. In this case, the organisation will have to analyse, for example, the possibility of extending the value of $\Delta T_{diagnostic}$ for detection or changing the probabilities of the transition between states for prediction. In contrast, a high false positive rate is not really a problem for critical environments given that this fact does not imply a loss of critical warnings. Lastly, it is worth stressing that the Prediction and Detection modules maintain a narrow relationship with each other. If the Detection module is not able to detect a delay attack, it is possible that the Prediction module increases its $C_{PredictionFN}$, since critical alarms may be delayed. Similarly, if a relay attack appears within the network, the values sequence may change the value of $C_{PredictionFN}$ or the $C_{PredictionFP}$ by re-sending messages with priority [0,2] or [3], respectively.

4 Conclusion

In this paper we have modelled a preventive and reactive system based on four main types of technologies: IWSNs, MANETs, the Internet and the ISA100.11a standard. With this, we aim to show the capabilities of these technologies for prevention, detection and response in critical environments, and of course, cover some still pending challenges for WASA. As a result, the proposed system is able to warn of an emergency situation in advance, detect anomalous behaviours and respond against crisis situations in order to minimise security risks and avoid a cascading effect. On the other hand, the solution, called here PDR, is also able to evaluate by itself the level of precision of its components of prevention and detection. This process will help the SCADA Center to maintain an exhaustive report corresponding to the functionality and reliability of the control service in the field and at any time.

Lastly, it is essential to continue advancing in this research area since there are a lot of open issues that need to be dealt with, such as security and connectivity problems when heterogeneous devices are being connected. For this reason, our next goal is to

research how to connect sensors to the Internet [18] when gateways are not working, and how alarms and measurements can reach the SCADA Center in emergency situations in a secure manner. Likewise, it would also be interesting to (i) provide location privacy mechanisms so as to protect the deployment of sensors and their visibility with respect to external threats [19]; and (ii) design and adapt lightweight computational intelligence techniques (e.g., expert systems or learning mechanisms) that may substitute the presence of human operators in the field.

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